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Abstract: Structural gaslighting arises when conceptual work functions to obscure the non-
accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm they produce 
and license. This paper examines the role that structural gaslighting plays in white feminist 
methodology and epistemology using Fricker’s (2007) discussion of hermeneutical injustice as 
an illustration. Fricker’s work produces structural gaslighting through several methods: i) the 
outright denial of the role that structural oppression plays in producing interpretive harm, ii) the 
use of single-axis conceptual resources to understand intersectional oppression, and iii) the 
failure to recognize the legacy of women of color’s epistemic resistance work surrounding the 
issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. I argue that Fricker’s whitewashed discussion of 
epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the United States is a form of structural gaslighting 
that fails to treat women of color as knowers and exemplifies the strategic forgetting that is a 
central methodological tactic of white feminism. 
 
 
“First and foremost, I aim to issue a caution . . . When addressing and identifying forms of 
epistemic oppression one needs to endeavor not to perpetuate epistemic oppression.” 
 – Kristie Dotson (2012, 24) 
 
“By talking about words, as we have seen them marshalled in the discussion, we hope to provide 
more clues to the duplicitous involvement of much of feminist thinking in the mythological 
fortunes (words and images) of patriarchal power.”  
– Hortense Spillers (1984, 159) 
 
Structural Gaslighting 
 
Structural gaslighting is a hallmark of white feminist methodology. This is not the type of 
gaslighting popularized in the 1944 Ingrid Bergman movie Gaslight, when one person 
knowingly, intentionally, and consistently undermines the perceptions of another with the goals 
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of making them appear ‘crazy’ to others, feel like they are losing their mind, and genuinely doubt 
their own grasp on reality. That more widely known type of gaslighting is certainly pervasive, 
deeply harmful, and a hallmark of emotionally abusive relationships—romantic, familial, and 
otherwise. Structural gaslighting, on the other hand, is less widely recognized than the traditional 
conception of gaslighting despite being significantly more pervasive and causing harm beyond 
the scale of individual psychology.  
Structural gaslighting describes any conceptual work that functions to obscure the non-
accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm that they 
produce and license. Individuals engage in structural gaslighting when they invoke 
epistemologies and ideologies of domination that actively disappear and obscure the actual 
causes, mechanisms, and effects of oppression. Structural oppressions are maintained in part 
through systems of justification that locate the causes of pervasive inequalities in flaws of the 
oppressed groups themselves while obscuring the social systems and mechanisms of power that 
uphold it.1 Davis and Ernst (2017) identify the practice of normalizing white supremacy by 
pathologizing resistance to it as a form of racial gaslighting. Structural gaslighting, of which 
racial gaslighting is a type, is one of the ways oppressors maintain hegemonic ideologies and 
sabotage conceptual resources that might accurately theorize the nature of the oppression and 
promote resistance. Structural gaslighting is thus deeply interwoven with intersecting structures 
of oppression and the willful ignorance that is required to maintain them. 
In this paper, I analyze some features of the pervasive practice of structural gaslighting as it 
is employed within white feminist epistemology. I look to Fricker’s (2007) discussion of 
hermeneutical injustice as a paradigm example of white feminist structural gaslighting. I argue 
that Fricker’s use of a single-axis lens of gender-based oppression to analyze both experiences of 
sexual harassment and the conceptual landscapes that surround them obscures the non-accidental 
relationships between the production of sexual harassment and the structures of oppression and 
colonization that support it. I illustrate this by discussing some of the ways that historical and 
contemporary structures of racism enable both the sexual harassment of women of color in U.S. 
contexts and facilitate the covering myths that help to erase and obscure its systematicity. In 
particular, I look at the ongoing structural vulnerabilities that began under slavery which 
continue to make Black women susceptible to sexual harassment today and I analyze some of the 
hermeneutical tools that work to obscure this reality. Given that women of color have been 
theorizing sexual harassment for as long as they have been experiencing it, by ignoring the 
conceptual knowledge produced by women of color on the phenomenon of sexual harassment 
and the norms, practices, and systems that license it, Fricker fails to treat women of color as 
 
1 See Collins (2000) for extensive discussion of how ideology functions to make oppression seem “natural, normal, 
and inevitable.” 
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knowledge creators. Since Fricker’s omissions and evasions both depend on the ideologies of 
and function to uphold colonialism and white supremacy, they are emblematic of the structural 
gaslighting that white feminism traffics in.  
One way that structural gaslighting upholds oppression is by denying that marginalized 
people’s experiences are informed, influenced, or partially constituted by structures of 
oppression and settler colonialism. This includes experiences of cultural genocide, sexual 
violence, racism, sexism, ableism, transmisogyny and transphobia, misogynoir, homophobia, 
heterosexism, classism. Conceptually severing individual instances and broader patterns of 
discrimination, violence, and oppression from the larger structures that produce them is a 
linchpin of structural gaslighting. Individuals, institutions, and social groups engage in structural 
gaslighting, regardless of whether they intend to do so, when they invoke oppressive ideologies, 
disappear or obscure the actual causes and mechanisms of oppression, and conceptually sever 
acts of oppression from the structures that produce them. 
Structural gaslighting is not identified in terms of any specific intention or goal of the 
perpetrator but by the function of its operation. Indeed, structural gaslighting is often perpetrated 
by people who are ‘well-intentioned’ or who identify as ‘allies’ (McKinnon 2017).2 Pohlhaus 
(2017) similarly recognizes the relative insignificance of intention when she defines her version 
of epistemic gaslighting in terms of its effective function rather than in terms of any individual 
agent’s intentional attitudes.3 Just as specific intentions are not required for an individual to 
engage in active or willful ignorance, neither are they required for an agent to be a perpetrator of 
gaslighting. Indeed, a conception of structural gaslighting appears to be operating in the 
 
2 McKinnon (2017) shows that purported allies are uniquely positioned to produce harm through structural 
gaslighting due to their presumed good intentions and knowledge. McKinnon clearly recognize that structures of 
oppression create non-accidental capacities for dominant groups to engage in gaslighting and set up conditions that 
make marginalized groups vulnerable to it. She analyzes some of the specific structural conditions that create the 
capacity for cisgender ‘allies’ to epistemically gaslight trans women in the struggle against transmisogynistic 
oppression. McKinnon offers a case where a trans woman, Victoria, raises a worry to a colleague, Susan, about 
having been repeatedly misgendered by another colleague, James. Susan dismisses Victoria’s concern as overly 
emotional and says that she has never heard James use the wrong pronoun and claims that he is really Victoria’s 
ally. Susan’s gaslighting of Victoria not only isolates her and contributes to a hostile work environment, it is a 
special form of betrayal because it comes from someone who purports to be Victoria’s ally. When a person who 
purports to stand in solidarity with members of an oppressed group denies and dismisses a group member’s accurate 
perception of their experiences with oppression, the harms can be significant. 
3 Pohlhaus’s epistemic gaslighting does not require that there be a specific agent who is the perpetrator. Pohlhaus 
describes epistemic gaslighting as occurring “when a person, practice, image, or institution exerts unwarranted 
pressure on an epistemic agent to doubt their own perception.” For Pohlhaus, the hallmark of this form of 
gaslighting is that the practice directs a person to perceive the world in a way that is both unwarranted and that puts 
them at odds with their own experience. This is another accurate way to characterize the gaslighting that takes place 
both in McKinnon’s example and in the case of Fricker’s work that is discussed here. 
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background of various accounts of willful or active ignorance.4 Mills’s (2007) account of white 
ignorance, adapted from Frye’s (1983) work, describes an epistemological system that requires 
structural gaslighting to carry out functions. White supremacy brings with it a set of standards of 
cognition that encompass an agreement by dominant agents to misinterpret the world.5 Systemic 
misunderstanding about the intertwined structures of white supremacy and settler colonialism 
takes a great deal of work to uphold and maintain. This is the work of structural gaslighting. 
Structural gaslighting can thus be characterized by the fact that it both draws its power from and 
simultaneously reinforces structural oppression in an unending positive feedback loop. 
Ruíz (2012, 2014, forthcoming) further conceives of gaslighting as something that occurs 
not only at structural scales but at pre-structural one as well. In (2012), Ruíz shows how 
European colonization disrupted pre-colonial ways of knowing in what is now identified as Latin 
America and tracks how colonial lineages create public policies, institutions, and political 
structures that reify and solidify settler epistemologies as the only legitimate form of knowledge. 
Colonialism’s foreclosure of Amerindian linguistic communities’ ability to collectively engage 
in interpretive processes of culture—and be heard and understood as coherent—is thus not only 
essential to understanding the multiplicity of social oppressions and their intersections in 
contemporary Latin American contexts; it is also a form of pre-structural gaslighting. Colonial 
violence is built into the very foundation of the contemporary hermeneutic frameworks that 
structure human experience in settler societies. One outcome of this is that the concept of 
violence in settler epistemologies non-accidentally excludes violence done to land, waterways, 
artifacts, and other loci of meaningful social relations and webs of knowledge within Indigenous 
epistemologies—what Ruíz (2019a, 2019b) calls hermeneutic violence.6 Notably, the gaslighting 
Ruíz describes is not just a result of the structural automation of colonial epistemologies and 
institutions. Rather, as a central feature of the genocides that made and continue to make settler 
institutions possible, this gaslighting was a precondition on the existence of self-propagating 
 
4 Pohlhaus’s (2012) account of willful hermeneutical ignorance, for instance, characterizes the en masse refusal of 
dominantly situated knowers to enter into cooperative epistemic interdependence with non-dominantly situated 
knowers as both a structural and agential form of injustice. 
5 Mills (2007) introduces the notion of white ignorance, an actively maintained form of ignorance that masquerades 
as knowledge and forms the epistemological dimension of the racial contract of white supremacy. The racial 
contract of white supremacy prescribes and demands “white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-
deception on matters related to race” (Mills 1997, 18). At the center of the false ideology of normative whiteness 
and eurocentrism is the white assumption that “we rule the world because we are superior; we are superior because 
we rule the world” (Mills 2007, 25). Such systemic white misunderstanding is not limited to the beliefs of white 
individuals. Rather, it characterizes the dominant mainstream worldview put forth by settler colonial epistemologies. 
White ignorance is an ignorance that is “propagated at the highest levels of the land, indeed presenting itself 
unblushingly as knowledge.” 
6 Ruíz (forthcoming) writes, “Violence under colonialism is a deeper, cultural, epistemic, and discursive 
phenomenon that supports the internal consistency of colonial power by limiting the domain of intelligibility—what 
violence can appear as—to settler colonial logics.”  
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systems of colonial epistemology. Thus, the gaslighting at the heart of colonial genocides—and 
their corresponding epistemicides—is pre-structural, rather than merely structural.7  
The colonial meta-epistemological framework that Ruíz identifies is just what is needed 
in order to make sense of white feminist methodologies and epistemology. Ruíz (forthcoming) 
notes, for instance, that Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice depends for its 
intelligibility on a colonial epistemic framework that is capable of recognizing only certain 
subjects as knowers. Because of this dependence, white feminism remains what Ruíz (2019a) 
calls “a lifeline of colonialism.” White feminism takes only a single-axis approach to gender-
based oppression, ignoring the intersections of sexist oppression with racism, classism, ableism, 
cissexism, transphobia, heterosexism, homophobia, and national context.8 White feminism 
ignores both the existence of interlocking structures of oppression and how those structures of 
oppression are situated within and dependent on persisting structures of neo-colonialism and 
settler colonial violence. White feminism is not universal feminism, though it takes itself to be. 
As Young (2010) points out, white feminism paints itself as one-size-fits-all feminism when it in 
fact fits very few. White feminism does not present itself as feminism that applies only to 
particularly situated women, namely those are white, non-disabled, class-privileged, straight, 
cisgender citizens of ‘Western’ colonial and settler-colonial nation-states. Because white 
feminism fails to situate itself as applicable only in certain contexts and instead masquerades as 
universal, the underlying message of white feminism is that if it does not fit your lived 
experience, there must be something wrong with your experience, your interpretation of your 
experience, or your understanding of reality. This willful misrepresentation of the lack of fit 
between white feminism and the social-political realities it fails to reflect exemplifies the 
structural gaslighting at its core. 
Feminist philosophy has a serious white feminism problem. This problem manifests in 
myriad ways, uncritically and unabashedly. Fricker’s (2007) book is a representative case study 
of this problem. In what follows, I discuss the various ways in which Fricker’s account of 
hermeneutical injustice engages in structural gaslighting. These include Fricker’s use of a 
 
7 For a study of some aspects of the pre-structural gaslighting that was central to settler missionaries’ colonial 
destruction of native Hawaiian epistemology and language, see Silva’s (2004) detailed account of Kanaka Maoli 
resistance efforts to preserve Hawaiian epistemologies and genealogies in the face of organized, systematic setter 
efforts at epistemicide. 
8 While the phrases “white feminism” and “white feminist” are often misunderstood—such misunderstanding 
follows from interpreting the semantics of these phrases in a framework of compositionality: x is a white feminist if 
x is both white and a feminist—this is not how the phrase is generally used in works that critique white feminism. 
“White feminism” refers to a specific way of practicing feminism, to methodological practices of centering and de-
centering. Young (2010) explains, “‘White feminism’ is the feminism that doesn't understand western privilege, or 
cultural context. It is the feminism that doesn't consider race as a factor in the struggle for equality. White feminism 
is a set of beliefs that allows for the exclusion of issues that specifically affect women of color. It is ‘one size-fits all’ 
feminism, where middle class white women are the mold that others must fit. It is a method of practicing feminism, 
not an indictment of every individual white feminist, everywhere, always.” 
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whitewashed single-axis framework to theorize gender-based oppression, her narrative that a 
conceptual understanding of sexual harassment did not exist before a consciousness-raising 
group in the Cornell Human Affairs Program gave it a name, and her failure to recognize the 
historical legacies of women of color who have produced resistant epistemologies of sexual 
harassment and who are primarily responsible for public knowledge of this phenomenon. I argue 
that Fricker’s whitewashing of the central roles that Black women and women of color have 
played in the legacy of epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the U.S. is a form of 
structural gaslighting that fails to treat women of color as knowers, and this is a reflection of the 
colonial meta-epistemological commitments of white feminism.  
 
‘Epistemic Bad Luck’ or Structured Misinterpretation? 
 
Fricker’s (2007) book is widely hailed as a path-breaking work of feminist epistemology 
that has paved the way for work at the intersection of epistemology and ethics. It has been 
extensively cited as offering a new framework for thinking about injustice and power dynamics 
within practices of knowledge production and distribution. It is also, in many ways, a perfect 
example of philosophy’s white feminism problem. Fricker’s work takes a single-axis approach to 
gender-based oppression and ignores women of color’s contributions to the area she is writing in, 
effectively deeming the 1970s the moment when workplace sexual harassment in the United 
States was first understood for what it was (2007, 162-63). Not only does she fail to think 
intersectionally about gender-based oppression but she fails to think structurally—even in a 
limited single-axis way—about oppression more generally. 
Many of the methods and claims in Fricker’s (2007) work function to produce gaslighting 
due to her outright denial of the role that oppression plays in producing structured 
misinterpretation and interpretive harm.9 Fricker casts as “epistemic bad luck” cases that she 
inaccurately construes as one-off instances of hermeneutical marginalization, but which actually 
have structural causes rooted in systems of domination. In her discussion of hermeneutical 
injustice, for instance she considers a fictional case of Joe, a straight white man who reports to 
the police that he is being stalked by another white man. When the police fail to take Joe’s 
concerns seriously, Fricker describes the injustice Joe suffers as “thoroughly ‘incidental’ rather 
than systemic’” (2016, 8; 2007, 158). She fails to recognize the role that rape culture and norms 
 
9 These notions come from Ruíz’s (2019) work on hermeneutic violence. Ruíz (forthcoming) offers a deeper critique 
of Fricker’s framing of hermeneutic harms in terms of ‘epistemic bad luck’ based on the non-accidental nature of the 
colonial violence that was required in order for the register in which Fricker speaks to be legible in an 
epistemological landscape governed by cultural imperialism. She writes, “On this view, it is nonsensical to talk 
about epistemic ‘bad luck’ or accidental cases of hermeneutic injustice against people of color, unless, of course, 
one is operating under a settler colonial logic and supportive infrastructural economy.”   
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of toxic masculinity under cis-heteropatriarchy play in producing the interpretive harm that Joe 
experiences. Feminist theorists have long emphasized that, while straight men are not oppressed 
by patriarchy, they are nonetheless systemically harmed by it in a number of ways. One is the 
widespread myth that men cannot be the victims of sexual violence, stalking, or domestic abuse, 
either by women or non-binary people or by other men. These myths prevent Joe’s reports of 
stalking from being audible and comprehensible to the police. Fricker’s claim that straight men 
whose experiences of stalking are disbelieved by law enforcement suffer from incidental rather 
than systematic hermeneutical marginalization obscures the non-accidental relationships that 
these harmful myths bear to the structures of oppression that produce them and to the 
experiences they obscure. This is an instance of structural gaslighting that harms male victims of 
sexual violence. This is not a small demographic harm, as it conceptually undermines attempts to 
stem the global trafficking of male minors and male youth of color by concealing the forces 
responsible for both widespread first-responder and provider biases against male victims as well 
as the lack of advocacy and funding resources available to them (Cole 2018). 
Fricker’s explicit denial that structural factors play a role in obscuring knowledge about 
disability produces further structural gaslighting. Tremain (2016) critiques Fricker for claiming 
that the hermeneutical marginalization experienced by a person with an undiagnosed or poorly 
understood “medical condition affecting their social behavior” is not hermeneutical injustice but 
merely “a poignant case of circumstantial epistemic bad luck” (2007, 152). Fricker’s denial of 
the structural nature of this interpretive harm exemplifies a pervasive pattern within dominant 
ableist ideologies wherein disabled people’s experiences of ableism are dismissed as individual 
aberrations rather than as systematic, non-accidental, and reliably produced by structures of 
oppression. It further compounds the cumulative medical gaslighting that is widely experienced 
by disabled people by portraying medical gaslighting itself as a result of mere “epistemic bad 
luck” rather than as the predictable and enduring consequence of the medicalization of disability 
within a materially harmful and ableist system of medical meaning-making. 
These are but a few of the myriad ways that Fricker’s work exemplifies white feminist 
gaslighting by inaccurately and harmfully portraying structurally produced forms of 
hermeneutical marginalization as mere “epistemic bad luck.” Fricker enacts structural 
gaslighting through her outright denial that the oppressive patterns of experience are structurally 
produced. Next, I consider structural gaslighting that follows from framing intersectional power 
dynamics as reducible to sexism and obscuring the histories of resistant epistemologies produced 
by women of color in Fricker’s narrative of the conceptual history of sexual harassment.  
 
Interpretive Flatlining: Single-Axis Frameworks as Structurally Prejudiced Resources 
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Not only does Fricker’s work engage in structural gaslighting about the relationship of 
structures of oppression to one-off instances of injustice, it produces structural gaslighting 
through its refusal to engage or acknowledge hermeneutical resources produced by histories of 
epistemic resistance. As Dotson (2012, 2014) points out, injustice with respect to unfair 
credibility ascriptions, inadequate conceptual resources, and structurally biased epistemological 
systems has long been theorized and discussed in the work of women of color generally and of 
Black women specifically.10 Fricker entirely ignores these intellectual legacies in her work, and 
this is especially apparent in her discussion of hermeneutical injustice. 
Hermeneutical injustice, according to Fricker (2007), occurs when there is a gap in the 
collective hermeneutical resources that leaves a marginalized group unable to understand or 
make sense of some aspect of their experience. Fricker illustrates the phenomenon by discussing 
Carmita Wood’s experience, as recounted by Susan Brownmiller, of leaving a job due to sexual 
harassment before the concept of sexual harassment was widely known. As the story goes, Wood 
filed for unemployment after leaving a job at the Cornell Nuclear Physics Department because of 
recurring sexual harassment that took a toll on her mental and physical well-being. When Wood 
attempted to fill in the part of the unemployment application that asked the reason she left her 
job, none of the options on the form adequately captured the reason Wood left. Her only option 
was to say that she left for personal reasons. Fricker identifies the fact that she had no way to 
communicate the reason she left as an instance of hermeneutical injustice. 
Fricker suggests that Wood had a large portion of her experience obscured from her 
understanding due to inadequate collective hermeneutical resources and that this fact is non-
accidental. Fricker writes: 
 
“What women like Carmita Wood had to contend with at work was no plain epistemic 
bad luck, for it was no accident that their experience had been falling down the 
hermeneutical cracks.” (Fricker 2007, 153) 
 
It is certainly clear that the epistemic injustice described was “no plain epistemic bad luck.” But 
there are two important questions to ask: 
 
1) Who are “women like Carmita Wood?” 
2) Why was it “no accident that their experience had been falling down the hermeneutical 
cracks?” 
 
 
10 See, for instance, Spillers (1984), Mohanty (1988), Spivak (1999), and Ortega (2006). 
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Further, how does the answer to the first question inform the answer to the second? Fricker 
purports to analyze the structural prejudice in the shared hermeneutical resources that prevent 
“women like Carmita Wood” from identifying and understanding their experiences of sexual 
harassment in the workplace (99).11 Yet Fricker ignores the structural conditions that make 
certain groups of women, such as those who are Black, Latinx, poor and working-class, 
Indigenous, disabled, and without documented legal status among those who are most vulnerable 
to sexual harassment. This results in a flattened and whitewashed analysis of the relevant 
“structural identity prejudice” at play (155). In analyzing how social structures produce 
hermeneutical injustice with respect to sexual harassment, Fricker focuses solely on how the gap 
in the shared hermeneutical resources harms “women” and ignores the intersection of sexism 
with racism, ableism, citizenship, and economic vulnerability under capitalism. Fricker writes, 
 
“Women’s powerlessness meant that their social position was one of unequal hermeneutical 
participation, and something like this sort of inequality provides the crucial background 
condition for the epistemic injustice affecting Carmita Wood. (2006, 98; 2007, 152).  
 
Importantly, Fricker suggests that “something like” the unequal participation of women in 
producing hermeneutical resources is the crucial background condition for understanding the 
epistemic injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment—not a critical background 
condition. Fricker’s choice to focus on Wood’s experience as representative of the interpretive 
harms surrounding sexual harassment exemplifies May’s (2012) observation that feminist theory 
remains wedded to the use of “gender-first imaginaries” despite the countless critiques levied 
against these gender-universalizing paradigms by women of color theorists.  
 
Naming and Power 
 
Not only does Fricker ignore the relevance of intersecting oppressions in creating the 
structural conditions that enable both workplace harassment and widespread misunderstanding of 
it, she ignores the legacies of understanding produced by Black women in the United States and 
by Indigenous and Latinx women on both sides of the settler border. Long before white women 
 
11 Various academic papers and news articles either explicitly refer to Carmita Wood as “African-American” 
(Backhouse 2012, 284) or imply that she is Black by including her in discussions of Black women’s historic roles in 
resistance to sexual harassment in articles with such titles as “Sexual harassment law was shaped by the battles of 
Black women” (Lipsitz 2017), and “Women of color in low-wage jobs are being overlooked in the #MeToo 
moment” (Lockhart 2017). An archives.com investigation of the 1940 U.S. census, however, reveals an entry under 
“Carmeta Dickerson,” Wood’s maiden name, containing her correct birthplace and listing her race as “White.” 
Ambiguity about Wood’s race aside, the problems with Fricker’s framing of sexual harassment as an issue solely of 
gender-based sexism remain. 
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activists such as Lin Farley led the meeting of the feminist consciousness-raising group to which 
Fricker attributes the origin of the concept of sexual harassment, Black women were speaking 
out about coercive sexual practices of the men they worked for. Despite this, Fricker ignores the 
entirety of Black women’s resistant knowledge of sexual harassment just as she ignores the role 
of white supremacy, ableism, capitalism, and settler colonialism in producing the structural 
conditions for sexual harassment and the conceptual resources to understand it.  
Fricker’s methodology reveals a tacit commitment to the assumption that until a group of 
white women activists at Cornell University came up with the perfect phrase to describe the 
problem of sexual harassment, the phenomenon had gone not only unrecognized but untheorized. 
This mirrors Fricker’s treatment of epistemic injustice as a concept that was philosophically 
untheorized and unexplored before her own engagement with it.12 In this section, I analyze some 
of the early resistant knowledge produced by U.S. Black women about the relationship among 
power, authority, and sexual harassment in order to demonstrate how Fricker’s methodological 
assumptions and practices obscure Black women’s knowledge production and produce structural 
gaslighting through situated ignorance and erasure.  
As long as Black women in the U.S. have experienced sexual violence, they have 
engaged in interpretive practices of theorizing and resisting it. As Davis emphasizes, 
“Throughout the history of this country, Black women have manifested a collective 
consciousness of their sexual victimization” (1983, 183). Black women have been experiencing 
and theorizing sexual harassment at the hands of employers since long before white women 
entered the workforce in droves and became vulnerable to workplace harassment themselves. In 
his recorded work of Black American oral history, anthropologist John Gwaltney interviews 
Mabel Lincoln about her life experiences. Lincoln developed insight about the motivations for 
and practices of sexual coercion during her years of domestic work in white homes (1993, 68): 
 
 “Now, if you are a woman slinging somebody else’s hash and busting somebody else’s 
suds or doing whatsoever you might do to keep yourself from being a tramp or a willing 
slave, you will be called out of your name and asked out of your clothes. In this world 
most people will take whatever they think you can give. It don’t matter whether they 
 
12 It should be noted, for instance, that several decades prior to Fricker, Spillers (1984) identified a version of the 
problem of naming and existence, of absence and unreality that Fricker later attempted to christen ‘hermeneutical 
injustice.’ In “Interstices: A Small Drama of Words,” Spillers contemplates lexical gaps in the dominative mode of 
discourse where knowledge and understanding of Black women’s sexuality should be. She further analyzes the 
structural conditions that give rise to a “lexical gap” in the universe of symbolic meaning regarding Black women’s 
sexual agency. Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice is thus best understood as an example of what Davis 
(2018) terms epistemic appropriation. 
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want it or not, whether they need it or not, or how wrong it is for them to ask for it. Most 
people figure, ‘If I can get it out of you, then I am going to take it.’” 
 
Lincoln’s analysis suggests a recognition that the desire to control and dominate tends to play a 
more central role than the desire for sexual pleasure in the motivation of sexual abusers.13 Nancy 
White, also interviewed by Gwaltney, is similarly aware that white men’s sexual harassment of 
Black women is an abuse of power that is facilitated by impunity: 
 
“White men were always messing with black girls. Sometime a black woman would have 
to move to someplace way away from there just so some white man or boy couldn’t get 
his hands on her. Now, the white women saw this and they didn’t like it, but they knew 
better than to stand up in Old Cracker’s face and tell him that he was wrong. Now . . . he 
knew he wasn’t right, but he figured like this: If I want to do it and you can’t stop me, 
well then, sad on you!”  (1993, 146) 
 
A theme throughout much of the knowledge that White shares based on her experience of having 
“worked for money for more than sixty-four years” is that Black women often see the truth 
behind white men’s oppressive actions in ways that white women choose not to. She describes 
white women as falling in line with what white men tell them so as not to jeopardize their 
standing within the power structure of white supremacy. Because white women wish to continue 
enjoying the benefits of their proximity to white male power, they know better “than to stand up 
in Old Cracker’s face” and challenge his abuses of Black women. White is keenly aware of the 
situated and self-serving nature of white women’s choices to refrain from challenging white male 
patriarchal power:14 
 
“If that man was bringing me pretty hats and nice shoes and getting somebody like me to 
look after his children, now if he was doing all those things and I was too lazy to get up 
off my do-nothing-stool and content myself with what I could do for myself and my 
children, well if that was the kind of person I was, I’d just bite my lip and shut my mouth. 
Now that is your white woman.”  
 
 
13 Second-wave white feminism often claims this insight for itself and frequently attributes it to Brownmiller (1975). 
This is another instance of whitewashing as structural gaslighting, as Black women have been theorizing the power-
based motivations for sexual violence since long before second-wave feminism existed. 
14 This is of central importance to explaining both the production of white feminist gaslighting and fact that the goal 
of white feminism is trying to gain equal standing for white women and white men under white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchy. 
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White identifies a common form of motivated ignorance among white women. Her analysis of 
white women’s allegiance to the hierarchy of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy and their 
commitment to refrain from challenging white male power thus extends into the epistemic realm. 
White women have a vested interest in falling in line with the perceptual and evaluative 
expectations that their white male companions impose on them: 
 
“Some women, white women, can run their husbands lives for a while, but the most of 
them have to take low when the devil tells them to and they have to see what he tells 
them there is to see. If he tells them that they ain’t seeing what they know they are seeing, 
then they have to just go on like it wasn’t there!” (149) 
 
As White points out, white women’s social position as white men’s romantic partners and 
dependents has made them less likely to accurately identify white male harassing behavior as an 
intentional expression of power and domination. White women often fail to conceive of sexual 
harassment as a form of oppression and are taken in by gaslighting euphemisms for it such as 
‘harmless flirtation’ in part because they are structurally invested in believing that white men are 
generally decent people who respect them as human beings. White women’s confusion thus 
results from the vested interest they have in maintaining their active ignorance about white male 
patriarchal power in order to preserve their place in the white supremacist capitalist patriarchal 
hierarchy.15 As White emphasizes, “When you come right down to it, white women just think 
they are free. Black women know they ain’t free. Now, this is the most important difference 
between the two” (Gwaltney 1993,147). 
White’s insights help to provide background for Fricker’s assumption that Carmita Wood 
was confused by her sexual harassment and failed to understand it for what it was, as well as her 
assumption that Wood’s harasser, Boyce McDaniel, may not have known or understood that his 
behavior was wrong. Wood’s harasser had in fact tried to keep Wood from being hired in the 
first place and had waged a public campaign against her after his efforts failed. This suggests that 
McDaniel’s sexual harassment and assault of Wood were acts of retaliation specifically intended 
to put her in her place. This background context casts doubt on Fricker’s characterization of 
Wood’s abuser as possibly not understanding the significance of his actions due to the purported 
hermeneutical lacuna in the collective conceptual resources.16 
 
15 This gendered dimension to the epistemological system of white supremacy further demonstrates the importance 
of considering intersectional factors in theorizing the material conditions of epistemic domination. While Mills does 
not consider this aspect in his (2007) “White Ignorance,” Frye identifies it in her (1983) essay “On Being White.” 
16 That the abuser means to demean and humiliate the victim is a clear thread running through many women’s 
experiences of harassment, and it has been especially salient to many Black women who have been harassed by 
white men. McDaniel was acting with impunity. The fact that Fricker attempts to secure the possibility of epistemic 
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That Fricker makes the largely baseless claim that Wood did not truly understand the 
campaign of harassment that was being waged against her is further evidence of the insufficiency 
of Fricker’s methodology and conceptual starting point. She writes, “It harmed Carmita Wood a 
great deal that she could not make adequate sense of it to herself, let alone to others” (2006, 
103). She uses an ableist metaphor to construct Wood as suffering from a “cognitive 
disablement,” which leaves her “deeply troubled, confused, and isolated” (2007, 151).17 Fricker 
makes these claims about Wood’s mental states without referring to any first-personal accounts 
of Wood discussing her experience. Rather than either interpreting Wood’s experience and 
beliefs on the basis of her own testimony or refraining from speculating about her inner states 
altogether, Fricker relies on projections that Brownmiller makes of Wood’s beliefs, emotions, 
and general psychological states. 
While those who experience sexual harassment are sometimes unable to make sense of 
their own experience, Fricker should not presume this is what happened to Wood, especially as 
she fails to consider Wood’s viewpoint as expressed in her own words. Dotson notes that people 
who are epistemically oppressed often have no difficulty readily articulating their experiences. 
“However, those articulations generally fail to gain appropriate uptake according to the biased 
hermeneutical resources utilized by the perceiver” (2012, 32).18 In Wood’s case, it seems that she 
understood perfectly well what was happening to her but was prevented from conveying it 
meaningfully to those in positions of power, in part due to their willful ignorance.19 
 
innocence-through-ignorance for a powerful white male assaulter who most likely knew exactly what he was doing 
throws into relief just how deep Fricker’s investment in narratives of white innocence goes (2007, 151). 
17 This reference to “cognitive disablement” to characterize a lack of understanding is an instance of the 
systematically harmful ableist practice in the epistemologies of ignorance literature of using ableist metaphors to 
illustrate conditions of un-knowing. Tremain (2017, 31-32) critiques the role that “the continued institutionalization 
of ableist language in philosophical discourse” plays in the exclusion of both critical philosophies of disability from 
mainstream philosophy as well as the exclusion of disabled philosophers from the discipline. Tremain also 
challenges philosophers’ reluctance and often outright unwillingness to give up these ableist practices, as 
exemplified for instance by Medina’s (2013) defense of his use of blindness as a metaphor for ignorance. It should 
be uncontroversial that philosophers working in this area must find language to express and refer to ignorance that is 
not rooted in metaphors of disability.  
18 Pohlhaus (2012, 716) suggests that willful hermeneutical ignorance, the pervasive pattern in which dominantly 
situated knowers have access to epistemic resources created from the experiences of marginalized knowers but pre-
emptively dismiss them and “continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the world” may be the more relevant 
concept here. Mason (2011) similarly critiques Fricker’s assumption that Wood was unable to understand her own 
experience as well as her assumption that marginalized people rely solely on “collective” (i.e. dominant) 
hermeneutical resources in order to understand their experiences. 
19 In transcripts from her hearing, Wood described Boyce McDaniel as a “dirty old man” who frequently made 
“palpably sexual gestures” and treated women as “second-class citizens and inferior beings” (Baker 2007, 28). This 
suggests that Wood was perfectly able to recognize McDaniel’s actions as intended to harm, degrade, embarrass, 
and terrorize her. She describes an episode at a company Christmas party in which he partially and forcibly disrobed 
her on the dancefloor, exposing her body to guests. Before leaving the job, Wood complained about McDaniel’s 
treatment of her to his superior, but her complaints were dismissed. This further supports the interpretation that 
Wood had a clear understanding of what she was experiencing before she reached out to the Cornell Human Affairs 
Program for support and that she was simply ignored by those in a position to hold McDaniel accountable. 
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The possibility that a victim of sexual harassment and assault might be able to understand 
the meaning of her abuser’s violations, despite the lack of widespread knowledge of the concept 
‘sexual harassment,’ would likely have seemed more plausible to Fricker if she had considered 
the long history of Black women’s theorization of and resistance to sexual violence. Fricker’s 
assumption that Carmita Wood could not understand her own experience of sexual harassment 
and assault results from an inadequate methodology that centers the experiences of relatively 
privileged white women, while ignoring the extensive conceptual work generated by Black 
women and women of color about sexual harassment. Fricker’s centering of white women’s 
experiences and conceptual practices leads to a theoretical framework that cannot adequately 
capture the phenomenon it aims to, even in the very limited cases that she actually considers.  
Fricker’s methodological oversights must be considered in light of what Dotson (2019) 
identifies as the ideational labor and aspirational costs of liberatory conceptual projects. For 
Dotson, ideational labor refers to “historical formations of ideas, concepts, and hermeneutic 
horizons that afford one conceptual and epistemic resources to direct and redirect attention.” 
There is a collective responsibility to understand that any successful written project was made 
possible in part by the ideational labor of those who came before us. Readers must also attend to 
these facts lest we too become culpable for the erasure and epistemic appropriation of the 
ideational labor that produced the spaces of conceptual possibility we now inhabit.  
 
Structural Vulnerabilities 
 
By positioning Wood’s experience as a paradigmatic case of sexual harassment in the 
workplace and analyzing it within a single-axis framework, Fricker whitewashes the picture of 
workplace harassment so that it may be universally relatable to ‘all’ women.20 Fricker’s 
whitewashing functions as structural gaslighting, as her erasure of the roles of racism and settler 
colonialism in facilitating and producing workplace harassment upholds the myth that they are 
irrelevant to understanding both women of color’s and Indigenous women’s experiences of 
sexual harassment and the epistemic oppressions they face when seeking rectification. Her 
disregard for the role these factors play in producing workplace sexual harassment is not 
harmless, as it obscures the relationship between settler white supremacy and the non-accidental 
construction of the “hermeneutical lacuna” surrounding conceptual resources about sexual 
 
20 This universalizing move is characteristic of white feminist gaslighting. On Fricker’s account, racism and 
colonization play no role in the structures of identity prejudice that obscure hermeneutical resources necessary to 
understand women’s experiences of sexual harassment in the workplace. Fricker’s whitewashing is an example of 
structurally biased hermeneutical resources being applied to a case for which far more suitable and fitting 
hermeneutical resources are already available. Such whitewashing therefore constitutes what Dotson (2012) calls 
contributory injustice. 
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harassment. That settler colonialism and white supremacy depend for their persistence on the 
very form of active disappearing that Fricker’s work generates reveals that a central function of 
white feminist gaslighting upholding white supremacist settler colonial domination. 
It is not the result of accident or oversight that migrant farmworker women working in 
the U.S. without documented legal status are among those most vulnerable to sexual harassment, 
assault, and rape in the workplace. In a 2010 study, 80 percent of women farmworkers in 
California’s Central Valley had experienced sexual harassment on the job (Waugh 2010). A 
report by Human Rights Watch (2012) reflects the pervasive and systemic nature of the sexual 
abuse that women farmworkers are subjected to: “Sexual violence and sexual harassment 
experienced by farmworkers is common enough that some farmworker women see these abuses 
as an unavoidable condition of agricultural work.”  
The structure of the farm hierarchy leaves foreman free to perpetrate abuse, and foremen 
often view the prospect of committing sexual violence against farmworker women as a perk of 
the job. They employ various strategies and methods to facilitate sexual violence, such as 
separating mothers from their daughters so that they have unhindered access to the children. The 
vast majority of supervisory positions are held by men (Waugh 2010). Many perpetrators hold 
directly supervisory roles over the women they harass, giving them consistent reason to be near 
the women they harass under the guise of checking their work. The harassment often continues 
over a long period of time, lasting for months or even years. 
Workers who push back against or file formal complaints about the abuse routinely 
experience retaliation in the form of heightened abuse, reduced work schedules, or being fired. 
Multiple family members often work on the same farm, so retaliation is often directed at the 
victim’s family members as well (Human Rights Watch 2012, 5). Extreme poverty and lack of 
other work possibilities often mean that staying in an abusive job is a matter of survival for 
farmworkers and their families. Farmworkers may also live in housing supplied by their 
employer, which means that losing their job would result in homelessness. 
Indigenous women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual and gender-based 
violence while working in the fields because of the cumulative, non-accidental structural 
vulnerabilities created and maintained by settler colonialism. For instance, since many 
Indigenous women do not speak English or Spanish, they are often unable to understand the 
content of trainings on workers’ rights. California law, for instance, requires only that trainings 
be conducted in both English and Spanish, thus ignoring the needs of Indigenous workers who 
often speak only Zapotec, Mixtec, Triqui, or Nahuatl, for instance. Indigenous women who have 
been harassed or attacked are often unable to communicate it to government or law enforcement 
agencies that only recognize the legitimacy of settler languages. They also frequently distrust 
governmental and law enforcement agencies not only because of their consistently violent 
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experiences with settler institutions, but because settler institutions are predicated on the 
entangled violences against their lands and bodies. The state-sponsored sexual violence that 
Indigenous migrant farmworkers face in the fields cannot even begin to be fully understood 
within the single-axis lens with which Fricker tries to analyze the “hermeneutical lacuna” 
surrounding “women’s” experiences of sexual harassment in the workplace. The cumulative, 
non-accidental structural vulnerabilities created by ongoing processes of settler colonial violence 
and dispossession are essential to understanding not just the political and economic foreclosures 
that Indigenous women farmworkers face in settler societies but the epistemic ones as well.  
Ruíz’s decolonial account of structural violence provides a needed conceptual 
framework, as it contains the recognition that structural violence is never accidental (ms). 
Rather, the forms of violence that are perpetrated by settler administrative systems and their 
organizing logics inherently depend on what Ruíz refers to as settler epistemic economies—
collections of hermeneutical resources specifically engineered to promote, uphold, and entrench 
colonial epistemic frameworks and forms of domination as the only possible epistemological 
systems and governance structures while violently foreclosing on alternative epistemologies. Her 
account not only helps to reveal the colonizing function of the ‘omission’ of on-the-job labor 
rights training offered in Indigenous languages. It also shows why Fricker’s concept of 
hermeneutical injustice is rendered dead-on-arrival as an interpretive resource that might be able 
to shed light on the epistemic brick walls that Indigenous women farmworkers collide with when 
attempting to speak and be heard about the pervasive non-accidental sexual harassment they 
experience while working on stolen lands under a settler colonial capitalist governance structure.  
Just as the reasons that Indigenous women farmworkers are subject to pervasive sexual 
harassment while working in agricultural economies north of the settler U.S.-Mexico border are 
non-accidental, specific histories and structural conditions have also made Black women in the 
settler colonial United States non-accidentally vulnerable to sexual violence by those on whom 
their lives and livelihoods have depended. As Nancy White’s and Mabel Lincoln’s insights 
show, U.S. Black women’s social locations within white supremacist capitalist patriarchy are 
also essential to understanding both their experiences of sexual harassment by abusive employers 
and colleagues and their resistant practices of theorization in the face of racist sexual oppression.  
Historical structures of oppression bear a non-accidental relationship to contemporary 
conditions of vulnerability to workplace sexual harassment. Under slavery, white enslavers 
systematically used sexual violence against enslaved Black women both as a form of control and 
domination and as a tool of wealth production. White enslavers not only treated Black women as 
property, they treated their bodies as units of capital capable of producing additional units of 
capital (Davis 1983, King 1988, Collins 2000). This resulted in a social structure that was held in 
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place as much by sexual violence as it was by other forms of physical punishment and 
psychological torture:  
 
Slavery relied as much on routine sexual abuse as it relied on the whip and the lash. 
Excessive sex urges, whether they existed among individual white men or not, had 
nothing to do with this virtual institutionalization of rape. Sexual coercion was, rather, an 
essential dimension of the social relations between slavemaster and slave. In other words, 
the right claimed by slaveowners over the bodies of female slaves was a direct expression 
of their presumed property rights over Black people as a whole. The license to rape 
emanated from and facilitated the ruthless economic domination that was the gruesome 
hallmark of slavery. (Davis 1983, 175) 
 
This violent domination of Black women’s bodies created a lasting legacy of white and state-
sponsored coercive control over Black women’s fertility and reproduction (Roberts 1997). The 
controlling image of Black women as hypersexual, promiscuous, and sexually available was 
developed under slavery to justify white enslavers’ systematic use of rape as a mechanism of 
terror and subordination. It continues to govern (white) conceptions of Black female sexuality 
and is one of the many factors that both contributes to and obscures the high rates of sexual 
violence that Black women experience today. 
After slavery was abolished, the work opportunities available to Black women remained 
primarily limited to those tasks that were assigned to them under slavery (Collins 2000, 60-63). 
According to Davis (1983, 175), the 1940 U.S. census showed that 59.5 percent of employed 
Black women worked as domestic servants and only 10.4 percent worked in non-domestic 
service occupations. Black women who worked in the homes of white families faced the constant 
threat of sexual harassment and sexual assault by their employers. White domestic employers 
treated Black women with an impunity they enjoyed as the result of the limited work available to 
them. The professional standards to which white employers held Black domestic workers were 
often characterized by deference and obedience rather than by domestic skill.21 These relations of 
domination and subordination enforced the idea that Black women existed in white homes as 
objects of control subject to the whims of their white employers, and this created optimal 
conditions for workplace sexual harassment and assault to flourish.  
 
21 Employer-employee relationships were marked by efforts to demean workers and remind them of their place in 
the classed, raced, and gendered social hierarchy. Norms establishing this included requiring workers to wear 
uniforms in the home, addressing workers as “girls,” restricting workers’ movements through the house, and 
speaking as though they were not present (Collins 2000). 
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Today, the service labor that has characterized much of the work delegated to Black 
women under white supremacist capitalist patriarchy has moved into the public sphere. Whereas 
most paid cooking and cleaning work used to take place in the private homes of white families, it 
is now performed as food service and janitorial labor for public corporations (Collins 2000, 
69).22 As the labor that Black women traditionally perform has moved out of the domestic sphere 
and into the open, so too has the workplace sexual harassment to which Black women are 
subjected. The mistreatment that Black women face from those they encounter in the workplace 
“resembles the interpersonal relations of domination reminiscent of domestic work” (62).  
The precarity of Black women’s paid labor further exacerbates their vulnerability to 
workplace abuses. Black women are overrepresented in low-paying and minimum-wage jobs, 
tipped positions, positions without benefits, and temporary positions with high rates of turnover. 
Not only is sexual harassment a stable feature of service-industry jobs, labor abuses such as wage 
theft are also rampant in this sector (Wohl 2014, Bobo 2010, Greenhouse 2009). These factors all 
contribute to the state of affairs in the contemporary United States in which Black women have 
little wealth, especially in later life, and significantly less wealth than white women (Chang 
2010, Brown 2012). These economic factors together create circumstances under which Black 
women are less able to leave jobs in which they are subject to sexual abuse, which in turn makes 
Black women more susceptible to becoming targets for sexual abusers in the workplace.  
 
Controlling Images and Dominating Mythologies 
 
The effects of structural oppression and colonization cannot be understood without their 
justifying ideological dimensions and the epistemic functions they fulfill. No understanding of 
the “dominating mythologies” that both produce and obscure male sexual violence against Black 
women can be accomplished without an intersectional analysis that attends to the role of racism 
in sexual harassment (Spillers 1984, 158). Just as the realities of sexual harassment in the 
workplace are importantly different for women of color and white women, so too are the 
hermeneutical resources used to justify it. Controlling images of white women’s sexuality under 
white supremacist patriarchy differ, for instance, from those governing Black women’s sexuality. 
White women are portrayed as fragile and in need of protection, in ways that are often linked to 
their presumed chastity, virtue, and innocence. Black women, on the other hand, have tended to 
be portrayed as promiscuous, sexually insatiable, and animalistic in their sexuality (Collins 2000, 
 
22 Collins writes, “The work performed by employed poor black women resembles duties long associated with 
domestic service. During prior eras, domestic service was confined to private households. In contrast, contemporary 
cooking, cleaning, nursing, and child care have been routinized and decentralized in an array of fast food restaurants, 
cleaning services, day-care centers, and service establishments. The locations may have changed, but the work has 
not” (2000, 69). 
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2005; Roberts 1997). These symbolic productions all take place within a conceptual landscape 
that withholds ascriptions of sexual agency from Black women. As Spillers writes, “In the 
universe of unreality and exaggeration, the black female is, if anything, a creature of sex, but 
sexuality touches her nowhere.” (Spillers 1984, 115) 
The images of masculinization and deviant hyper-sexuality that have characterized 
representations of Black womanhood under white supremacist capitalist patriarchy have 
provided a foil against which white women’s femininity and fragile womanhood have been 
constructed (Carby 1982). In the 1800s, Sarah Baartman's body became a site of projection for 
the colonial fantasy that would eventually employ theories of scientific racism to delineate the 
borderline between the ‘abnormal African’ woman and ‘normal European’ woman.23 As Carby 
notes, “Our continuing struggle with History began with its ‘discovery’ of us” (1982, 110). 
Baartman, a Khoikhoi woman born in what is now South Africa, was brought to England and 
later France where she was displayed in a loin cloth to prurient European audiences who 
marveled at the size and shape of her breasts and buttocks. After her death, Georges Cuvier 
dissected her body and used it as a basis for his theories of scientific racism and sexual 
primitivism. Despite the fact that Baartman had never allowed audiences to see her naked, 
Paris’s Musée de l’Homme displayed her jarred remains, including her skeleton, brain, and vulva 
to the public until 1974—a grotesque manifestation of white colonial society’s sense of 
entitlement to and ownership of Black women’s bodies.24  
White entitlement to Black women’s bodies is a central feature of the controlling image 
of the Jezebel, which continues to govern popular imaginaries of Black female sexuality today. 
Crenshaw (1994, 3) identifies some of the measurable effects of the widely-held misogynoiristic 
notion that Black women and girls are hypersexual: “As recently as 1989, jurors acquitted a 
defendant of the rape of a 12-year-old African American stating that ‘a girl that age from that 
neighborhood probably wasn’t a virgin anyway.’”25 Part of the function of the controlling image 
as hermeneutical resource is to produce high rates of sexual violence against Black women while 
simultaneously obscuring its pervasiveness and foreclosing the possibility of redress for it. 
As a powerful tool in what Spillers (1984, 167) identifies as the “universe of symbol-
making” regarding Black women’s sexuality, the Jezebel image also governs the treatment of 
Black women by both white women and white men. Cottom (2013) describes an experience in a 
 
23 Scientific racists treated the presumed physical differences between Baartman and ‘European’ women as proof of 
the savageness, deviant sexuality, and promiscuity of the ‘African race.’ 
24 Nelson Mandela demanded the repatriation of her remains in 1994. They were not returned to South Africa to be 
buried until 2002. 
25 She goes on, “A recent study in Dallas revealed that the average sentence given to the rapist of a Black woman 
was two years . . .Interviews with jurors reveal that the low conviction rate of men accused of raping Black women 
is based on ongoing sexual stereotypes about Black women.” 
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bar in North Carolina where she told her date that one of the drunk white couples there would be 
offering her free liquor and attempting to feel her breasts “within the hour.” She explained her 
“long, storied, documented history of being accosted by drunk white men and women in 
atmospheres just like these.”26 Eventually, a white woman “bumps and grinds” up to their table, 
buys them a fishbowl, and tells Cottom that her boyfriend would love to see them dance together. 
Cottom directly relates her experiences to controlling images that portray Black women, 
especially those with larger bodies, as always interested in and available for sex. She writes, “Fat 
non-normative black female bodies are kith and kin with historical caricatures of black women as 
work sites, production units, subjects of victimless sexual crimes, and embodied deviance.” As 
Cottom’s experience and her analysis of it show, the Jezebel controlling image remains central to 
the logic of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy that facilitates white entitlement to access and 
control Black women’s bodies.  
The pervasive and pernicious nature of this controlling image is by no means limited to 
the conservative American South; it also dominates the white liberal cultural imaginary. In 2016, 
white American author Stephen O’Connor published a novel called Thomas Jefferson Dreams of 
Sally Hemings, which explores the ‘romance’ between Jefferson, a white male enslaver 
‘founding father’ and Hemings, a Black girl child whom Jefferson enslaved and repeatedly 
raped. In a book review published by NPR, Jean Zimmerman (2016)  describes the work as “the 
agonizing crashing together of love and slavery.” Zimmerman uncritically quotes O’Connor’s 
own assessment of the relationship as “somewhere along the spectrum between love and 
Stockholm syndrome.” She writes: 
  
“Though Jefferson was 46 when he bedded 16-year-old, lovely, yellow-silk-clad Sally at 
his grand hôtel, we see a passion between them. The entire book revolves around the 
issue of consent — to what degree Sally determines her own fate with her master or 
whether she's being forced, whether freedom to say no rather than yes could ever be a 
possibility for an enslaved female, a child at that.”  
 
It is deeply indicative of the ideology that attempts to locate pathological carnal desire in the 
bodies of Black women and girls that Zimmerman finds herself able to ask the question of 
whether an enslaved girl child can consent to sex with her adult male enslaver.  
 
26 Cottom catalogues some of the incidents of harassment she’s experienced in such settings: “Women asking to feel 
my breasts in the ladies’ restroom. Men asking me for a threesome as his drunk girlfriend or wife looks on smiling. 
Frat boys offering me cash to ‘motorboat’ my cleavage. Country boys in cowboy hats attempting to impress his 
buddies by grinding on my ass to an Outkast music set. It’s almost legend among my friends who have witnessed it 
countless times.” 
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The answer, of course, is no. Hemings did not have “the freedom to say no rather than 
yes,” as her very survival depended on her not saying no. The possibility of saying ‘no’ without 
punishment is a necessary condition on consent’s being freely given, on saying ‘yes’ having any 
meaning at all. This was not a possibility for Hemings, who was owned as property by an 
enslaver who created a political system specifically to be able to enslave, rape, torture, and kill 
human beings like her with impunity. Nonetheless, O’Connor finds this subject matter to be 
fitting material for a romantic narrative and Zimmerman is happy to enter his fantasy world with 
him. It is difficult to understand how these imaginative feats and conceptual contortions could be 
possible for them unless they both, on some level, conceive of Black women and girls as un-
rapeable. To see the possibility of freely given consent in the context of chattel slavery—a 
scenario in which there so clearly is none—is to see Black women and girls as incapable of being 
victims of sexual violence. This example reveals how effective the violent ideology of the 
Jezebel remains today.  
The influence of assumptions about Black women’s sexuality, promiscuity, and fertility 
continues to contribute to widespread harm, abuse, and violence. The legacy of slavery continues 
to shape U.S. Black women’s contemporary experiences of sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Historical patterns of sexual coercion and white (especially male) sexual entitlement to Black 
women’s bodies continue to construct the conceptual landscape that allows for unconstrained 
sexual violence against Black women. A white feminist approach to the hermeneutics of sexual 
harassment contributes to the “structure of unreality” that Black women face in the shared 
conceptual landscapes of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, a vacuum that is filled by 
controlling images. This is not, as Spillers notes, a harmless omission. She writes, “The rift 
translates into unthinkable acts, unspeakable practices” (Spillers 1984, 156). White feminist 
epistemology is complicit in sexual violence against Black women insofar as it works to 
maintain conceptual systems that continue to obscure such violence. 
Fricker’s framing of the structural conditions that produce hermeneutical injustice 
surrounding sexual harassment in terms of “women’s powerlessness” is a devastatingly 
inadequate conceptual framework for the problem at hand. Fricker’s misuse of conceptual 
resources obscures the role that white supremacist capitalist patriarchy plays in producing and 
protecting practices of sexual harassment against Black women specifically and women of color 
more generally. Lest epistemic harms be mistaken for disembodied ones, the “unthinkable acts” 
to which Spillers refers, the ones that are facilitated by the epistemic rift that Fricker is complicit 
in maintaining, are acts that take place in the material world and that are borne upon the bodies 
of human beings. Taking an intersectional approach to mapping the conceptual landscape of 
sexual harassment in the workplace instead of a white feminist one is thus not merely a 
methodological imperative, it is an ethical one.  
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Women of Color’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment 
 
Women of color in the U.S. have historically been at the forefront of resistance to sexual 
harassment through both litigation and labor organization. Epistemic resistance to oppression 
cannot be considered independently from activism and organized resistance. The work of Black, 
Latinx, and Indigenous women labor organizers like Floria Pinkney, Lucy Parsons, Maria 
Moreno, Dolores Huerta, and Luisa Moreno has been essential to publicly revealing the ways 
that the systems of gender domination that produce sexual harassment are inextricably bound up 
with systems of racism, colonialism, and capitalist labor exploitation. Women of color have long 
recognized that the ability to be free from sexual assault in the workplace cannot be disentangled 
from systemic barriers to fair wages, labor protections, housing, education, food access, health 
care, and immigration. Catherine Albisa, co-founder and Executive Director of National 
Economic & Social Rights Initiative explains, “While counterintuitive, you can’t end gender-
based violence by working directly on gender-based violence. You can only end gender-based 
violence by working on structural issues that enable it, and those also shape the wider array of 
abuses affecting the whole community” (Chang 2018). 
This insight remains at the core of the Fair Food Program, one of the most productive and 
effective large-scale efforts to reduce workplace sexual harassment in the United States today. 
Started in the early 2000s by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, the program works by 
securing agreements from major companies such as Walmart, McDonald’s, and Yum! Brand 
Foods to only purchase produce from farms who have signed on to a strict code of conduct, 
drafted by farmworkers, requiring a variety of fairer labor practices including zero tolerance for 
sexual assault (Fair Food 2017). This work is structurally re-shaping the landscape of agricultural 
work in the United States, and it is made possible by the conceptual and epistemic resistance 
work done by migrant farmworker women to reveal the ways that sexual harassment is 
predictably facilitated by interlocking systems of power, control, and domination.   
Women of color’s diverse positionalities are non-accidentally related to the strategies of 
epistemic resistance they have created. As Collins (2000, 15) notes, for instance, since Black 
women in the U.S. have experienced continued political exclusion, ideological marginalization, 
and economic vulnerability, these factors and others give rise to “distinctive angles of vision” on 
their experiences and the structures that produce them. It is thus not surprising that Black women 
plaintiffs were among the first to conceive of sexual harassment as illegal sex discrimination.27 
 
27 Baker (2004, 8) writes, “Racist and sexist stereotypes melded in the harassment directed toward African American 
women, giving them a particularly clear understanding of the discriminatory nature of sexual overtures in the 
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Pamela Price, one of the student plaintiffs in the first case to establish that sexual harassment was 
sex discrimination and thus illegal under Title IX, recognized the role that racist sexist ideology 
about Black women played in her harasser’s actions. After experiencing sexual harassment from 
a white male professor at Yale University who retaliated against her when she refused his 
requests for sex, Price saw that historically developed controlling images of Black women’s 
sexuality played a central role in the harassment she experienced. Noting that her harasser 
invoked racist tropes in his sexually humiliating comments toward her, Price characterized her 
experience of harassment as an instance of “racist sexual discrimination” and argued that her 
professor retaliated against her as punishment for failing to live up to “a historical conception of 
the relationship between my racial heritage and my sexuality” (Baker 2007, 61). Price’s ability to 
clearly conceive of how her professor had violated and harmed her was integral to her pursuit of 
legal action that led to the establishment of one of the most important precedents for university 
students, namely that those who experienced sexual harassment in educational institutions could 
sue the school under Title IX for monetary damages.  
Sexual harassment law is similarly indebted to trailblazing Black women plaintiffs like Diane 
Williams, Paulette Barnes, Mechelle Vinson, Sandra Bundy, and Anita Hill.28 These women’s 
efforts to publicly resist their experiences of sexual harassment through the courts (and televised 
Senate hearings) not only brought the problem into public awareness but radically changed the 
legal and conceptual landscape surrounding sexual harassment, which was previously 
characterized as an individualized, private, and personal transgression and therefore not 
governed by laws regulating employment discrimination. These women worked to create new 
epistemological frameworks in the legal sphere, and the innovation they produced cannot be 
severed from their distinctive angles of vision.  
Fricker’s failure to situate her analysis of the epistemic activism by Cornell feminists within 
this history is one instance of the larger pattern of white feminist indifference to women of 
color’s experiences of harassment and their practices of resistance to it. Focusing solely on the 
epistemic resistance work produced by the white women in the Cornell Human Affairs Program 
 
workplace. Informed by a history of race discrimination and sexual abuse, these women did not mistake sexual 
harassment for harmless flirtation.” 
28 Diane Williams brought the first successful lawsuit against an employer who retaliated and ultimately fired her 
after she repeatedly denied his harassing advances. Her case, Williams vs. Saxbe was decided in 1976 and was the 
first to set a precedent of sexual harassment as an employment-related, gender-based civil rights violation (Baker 
2007, 21). In 1978, Mechelle Vinson filed a lawsuit against the bank where she worked after her manager had 
repeatedly raped her under threat of firing her. Her case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson went to the Supreme Court, 
and in 1986, the Court ruled that a company can be held responsible for a supervisor’s harassment even if the 
company was unaware of it. In the Court’s decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote, “Without question when a 
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, the supervisor discriminates on the 
basis of sex” (Brown 2017). Vinson’s case thus became the first to successfully use Title VII in a Supreme Court 
case on sexual harassment, establishing that sexual harassment was discrimination on the basis of sex and thus 
prohibited by law. 
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is whitewashing. Fricker engages in this whitewashing by failing to address the central role that 
Black women played in litigating some of the first and most important cases of sexual 
harassment in the U.S. and by ignoring the knowledge that women of color labor activists 
created surrounding the interlocking nature of systems that produced the conditions for capitalist 
exploitation and extractivism to thrive alongside the violation of women’s bodies. Attending to 
these women’s resistance efforts should have been essential to Fricker’s project since their 
efforts were characterized in significant part by their methods of epistemic resistance. Fricker’s 
failure to recognize the conceptual work produced by women of color who recognized sexual 
harassment in the workplace as a form of coercion and discrimination is a failure to consider 
their agency and resistance in the face of oppression. By failing to situate the work of the Cornell 
consciousness-raising group within the broader context of women of color’s resistance to sexual 
harassment, and by ignoring women of color’s conceptual contributions to this history of 
resistant interpretive practices, Fricker demonstrates a more general failure to conceive of 
women of color as knowledge creators.   
 
Situated White Feminist Ignorance As Willful Ignorance 
 
“Contributory injustice occurs because there are different hermeneutical resources that 
the perceiver could utilize besides structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources, and 
the perceiver willfully refuses ‘to acknowledge and acquire the necessary tools for 
knowing whole parts of the world.’” – Dotson (2012, 32) 
 
Dotson (2012) identifies contributory injustice as a third-order form of epistemic 
injustice—one that Fricker (2007) not only fails to account for but engages in herself. 
Contributory injustice occurs when the hermeneutical resources necessary for marginalized 
knowers to understand their experience are available, but there are structural biases against their 
use. Someone commits contributory injustice when their situated ignorance in the form of willful 
hermeneutical ignorance causes them to use the wrong set of hermeneutical resources, harming a 
knower’s epistemic agency in the process. Like willful hermeneutical injustice, contributory 
injustice is both structural and agential. It is structural because the biases that cause certain sets 
of hermeneutical resources to be seen as coherent and intelligible are both a result and continued 
cause of structural domination. It is agential because the epistemic harm is caused by an agent’s 
situated ignorance in the form of willful hermeneutical ignorance.  
By employing a single-axis framework of sexist oppression to analyze sexual harassment 
in the workplace and by ignoring the historical legacies of women of color’s epistemic resistance 
to it, Fricker uses structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources at every turn in her analysis of 
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hermeneutical injustice. Fricker’s use of these resources can be reliably predicted from her social 
location, and thus follows from her situated ignorance.29 
Fricker’s ignorance is not only situated and reliable, it is also willful. Fricker chooses not 
to acknowledge, for instance, the part of the world in which Black women’s experiences of 
sexism are racialized and the racism Black women face is gendered. Fricker willfully refuses to 
acknowledge the ways that race- and class-based oppression intersect with sexism and misogyny 
to produce especially harmful outcomes for working-class women of color.30 When she engages 
with issues of anti-Black racism, she focuses solely on examples that primarily affect Black 
men.31 She does not explicitly discuss experiences of racism faced by Black women or non-
Black women of color. When she does discuss forms of discrimination that Black women do 
face, such as sexual harassment in the workplace, she leaves racism entirely out of her analysis 
of the structural forces that produce it.  
Further evidence for the claim that Fricker’s ignorance is not merely situated but also 
willful is that many white women who have written about sexual harassment have actually 
acknowledged the epistemic significance of the fact that so many of the early plaintiffs in sexual 
harassment cases were Black women and women of color. Catherine Mackinnon (1979), for 
instance, who helped write Mechelle Vinson’s appellate brief for the Supreme Court, connects 
Black women’s marginalization with their pathbreaking efforts to resist harassment.32 That 
Mackinnon recognizes that the multiple jeopardies that Black women face in U.S. society create 
 
29 Dotson (2011) characterizes situated ignorance as follows: “Situated ignorance follows from one’s social position 
and/or epistemic location with respect to some domain of knowledge. It is an ‘unknowing’ that is prompted by social 
positioning that fosters significant epistemic differences among diverse groups.” (248) 
30 Fricker also refuses to acquire the tools necessary to learn about these parts of the world. She does not, for 
instance, cite the work of any Black women in her (2007) book that claims to introduce the concept of epistemic 
injustice, nor does she cite the work of any women of color outside academic philosophy. This is especially 
significant given that, by the time she published her (2007) book, women of color theorists had already 
conceptualized complex aspects of the phenomena that Fricker would later call testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice (See, for instance, Carby 1982; Spillers 1984; Mohanty 1988; Spivak 1999; Collins 2000, 
2005).   
31 These include Britain’s “cultural forgetting of the involvement of black Caribbean and African soldiers in the 
Second World War” (Fricker 2016, 14-17) and a fictional instance of a white woman falsely accusing a Black man 
of rape from the novel To Kill a Mockingbird. It is worth asking why Fricker (2007) chooses to focus on a fictional 
example rather than on any of the numerous actual occurrences of this phenomenon, especially given that she does 
not situate the fictional instance within U.S. white supremacy’s epidemic of lynching. She also fails to recognize the 
fact that the most common justifications for the lynching of Black men were baseless allegations that they had raped 
a white woman (Wells-Barnett 1900)—something that forms the central narrative arc in the fiction she uses to 
exemplify testimonial injustice.  
32 She writes, “Black women’s least advantaged position within the economy is consistent with their advanced 
position on the point of resistance. Of all women, they are most vulnerable to sexual harassment, both because of the 
image of black women as the most sexually accessible and because they are most economically at risk. These 
conditions promote black women’s resistance to sexual harassment and their identification of it for what it is.” 
(1979, 53) 
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the possibility of distinctive angles of vision on the interlocking systems of oppression they exist 
within suggests that occupying a social position that gives rise to situated ignorance is not 
sufficient for maintaining it.  
Further, Fricker actually engages with the work of white women feminist theorists who 
recognize and discuss the structural importance of racism and other dimensions of oppression 
when it comes to understanding sexual harassment. In her (1999) memoir, on which Fricker 
relies heavily, Brownmiller connects the intersectional oppression of women of color to their 
positions on the frontlines of resistance. She recognizes that the number of high-profile sexual 
harassment litigants who were Black women was non-accidental. Brownmiller connects the 
social realities of women of color and queer women to their epistemic positions that allowed 
them to clearly identify sexual harassment as harmful and wrong despite widespread interpretive 
efforts to paint it as complimentary or trivial.33 Brownmiller recognizes not only that differences 
in social location are relevant to experiences of sexual harassment but that such differences are 
relevant to the creation of knowledge about these experiences and their relationship to structural 
domination. 
Perhaps the most significant evidence that Fricker’s ignorance is willful is the fact that 
Brownmiller’s (1999) discussion of this topic appears in the very same chapter from which 
Fricker draws her discussion of Carmita Wood’s experience. Though Brownmiller discusses the 
non-accidental nature of Black women’s epistemic insights regarding sexual harassment in the 
very work that Fricker cites, Fricker chooses not to acknowledge racist or capitalist oppression in 
her explanation of “the background conditions that were conducive to the relevant hermeneutical 
lacuna” surrounding sexual harassment (2007, 152). That this section appears between two of the 
passages that Fricker quotes in her own work suggests that Fricker was likely aware of the racial 
and economic dimensions of sexual harassment cases in the United States but nonetheless chose 
not to include them in her (2007) work. Thus, in her discussion of why it was “no accident” that 
the experiences of “women like Carmita Wood” “had been falling down the hermeneutical 
cracks,” (2007, 153) it was also no accident that Fricker let important aspects of other women’s 
sexual harassment experiences slip through the hermeneutical cracks of an interpretive 
 
33 Brownmiller writes, “Adrienne Tomkins happened to be white, but most of the aggrieved women seeking justice 
in these and other pioneer cases were working class and black. . . Black women were significant at every stage in 
sexual harassment law. It's interesting to speculate why so many of the courageous litigants were women of color, 
just as it's interesting to ponder the significance of lesbian feminist leadership in the naming and launching of sexual 
harassment. I'm inclined to believe that neither phenomenon was totally accidental. I believe lesbian feminists, the 
angriest of the angry, initially saw unwanted sexual attention by men with greater clarity than their heterosexual 
sisters and were less of a mind to be persuaded that it was vaguely complimentary or basically trivial. And black 
women, emerging from a history of slavery, segregation, job discrimination, and sexual abuse, were fighting mad. 
Doors were beginning to open for them, and then, bam, the same old story, opportunity turning to ashes. The success 
of race discrimination complaints during this time may have encouraged women of color to pursue their rights in 
cases of sexual harassment” (1999, 286-7). 
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framework that she herself designed. This reveals the legacy of structural gaslighting in white 
feminist epistemology.  
 
Beyond ‘Strategic Forgetting’ 
 
Feminist epistemology that aims to be liberatory must work to create practices of critical and 
collective self-reflection. White feminist philosophy’s shortage of such practices is evident in its 
persistent reliance on what Tompkins (2016) calls “strategic forgetting”—a white feminist 
methodology that is especially apparent in Fricker’s work: 
 
“The narrative of apparent progress embedded in the teaching of feminist theory often rests 
on some very strategic forgetting, usually of the work of women of color, in particular black 
women. Ultimately the ‘what about’ question is often answered with some blunt historical 
facts: X was speaking all along, over here, where other people were listening, stealing and 
forgetting to footnote.” (Tompkins 2016) 
 
Such strategic forgetting is a primary mechanism of structural gaslighting, but its effects reach 
well beyond those who pay the price with their own felt knowledge. In many ways, Fricker’s 
work has set the terms of the debate in contemporary feminist epistemology. The conceptual 
landscape that she has constructed—along with its glaring structural absences, erasures, and 
disappearances—is now construed as the common ground. It forms the epistemic field upon 
which fair play is imagined to take place. The question then becomes: what to do about the sad 
state of this field? It is unquestionable that white feminist theory has been built on a foundation 
of simultaneously ignoring and stealing the theoretical work of women of color and Native 
feminist theorists. But it does not follow that mere ‘inclusion’ and ‘recognition’ of these 
perspectives within existing settler colonial white feminist frameworks offers a solution (Arvin, 
Tuck, and Morrill 2013).34 As Tompkins emphasizes, a radical reframe is needed to adequately 
address the issue of perspectives that have ‘gone missing’ in white feminist theoretical 
frameworks: 
 
Often we are tempted to ask the “what about” question: e.g., what about the people who 
are excluded from this theory? Although not an unreasonable question, asked in this 
 
34 As Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill (2013, 17) emphasize, “It is important for feminist discourses to determine ways to 
engage Native feminist theories and the experiential realities of Indigenous women–identified people without 
absorbing or merely including them into the existing canon of gender and women’s studies literature. . . The project 
of inclusion can serve to control and absorb dissent rather than allow institutions like feminism and the nation-state 
to be radically transformed by differing perspectives and goals.” 
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manner this is not really a sophisticated question because it doesn’t open up conversation. 
The only answer to “what about” is: they aren’t there. More productive is to ask: how do 
the exclusions at the heart of this work facilitate certain conclusions, problems or 
paradigms, what are these paradigms and what happens when we consider this theory in a 
broader context? 
 
The epistemic exclusions at the heart of white feminist philosophy facilitate paradigms that can 
no longer be allowed to persist. There are a multitude of diverse theoretical frameworks and 
epistemologies upon whose active disappearing the conceptual foundations of white feminist 
philosophical schemas are predicated. If something like epistemic justice is a goal of feminist 
epistemology, then feminist philosophy must work to dismantle and replace epistemic 
institutions built on conceptual foundations of white supremacy and colonialism. This requires 
much more than just plugging up the “hermeneutical lacunae” that remain within existing 
epistemologies of domination. It requires an exercise of courage and accountability that cannot 
coexist with the instinct to preserve white innocence and blamelessness that drives so much of 
white feminist discourse. Whether white women working in feminist theory are willing rise to 
this challenge remains to be seen. 
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